

Simplified Vehicle Operations Roadmap

Ken Goodrich, Senior Research Engineer
Mark Moore, Senior Advisor for On-Demand Mobility

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Goals and Benefits ODM Safety and Ease of Use



Goals

- Improved ease of use and safety
 - Long-term goals: automotive-like training and workload with better-than automotive safety
 - Ease-of-use encompasses initial and recurrent training, preflight & in-flight workload


Benefits

- Necessary (but not sufficient) for practical aircraft-based ODM
- Faster, less risk averse, lower-cost proving ground for new technology and operations beneficial to transport aircraft
- Technologies that help address NTSB's Most-Wanted aviation safety improvements
 - General aviation loss of control
 - Public helicopter safety
 - Procedural compliance

What are the Challenges?



Gulf of Technology, Policy, and Acceptance



Presentation Outline: Safety and Ease of Use



- ➤ Alignment of with NASA Strategic Thrusts
- > Performance requirements and current state of the art
 - How safe is safe enough and is it achievable?
 - How has technology simplified piloting already?
 - Emerging automation technologies
- "Simplified Vehicle Operations" (SVO), proposed research strategy
 - Planned evolution & incremental revolution
 - Pilots -> Trained operators -> users
- **≻** Next steps

k.goodrich@nasa.gov

4

NASA Aeronautics Strategic Thrusts: Safety, Ease







Safe, Efficient Growth in Global Operations

 Enable full NextGen and develop technologies to substantially reduce aircraft safety risks



Innovation in Commercial Supersonic Aircraft

Achieve a low-boom standard





Ultra-Efficient Commercial Vehicles

 Pioneer technologies for big leaps in efficiency and environmental performance



Transition to Low-Carbon Propulsion

 Characterize drop-in alternative fuels and pioneer low-carbon propulsion technology





Real-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance

 Develop an integrated prototype of a real-time safety monitoring and assurance system



Assured Autonomy for Aviation Transformation

Develop high impact aviation autonomy applications

Safety of Small Aircraft Compared to Alternatives



| Mode | Fatalities per hundred million passenger miles | Rate relative to passenger cars |
|------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Passenger Cars | | |
| Motorcycles | | |
| US Airline Flights | | |
| Commuter Airlines (<10 passengers) | | |
| General Aviation | | |

Challenge: Bring safety of small aircraft transportation up to level demonstrated by commuter airlines

Safety of Small Aircraft Compared to Alternatives



| Mode | Fatalities per hundred million passenger miles | Rate relative to passenger cars |
|------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Passenger Cars | 0.643 | 1.0 |
| Motorcycles | 29.9 | 46x less safe |
| US Airline Flights | 0.0038 | 167x safer |
| Commuter Airlines (<10 passengers) | 0.102 | 6.7x safer |
| General Aviation | 7.8 (estimated) | 12x less safe |

Challenge: Bring safety of small aircraft transportation up to level demonstrated by commuter airlines



1990's



2015



+ tablet-based electronic flight bag for additional pre and in-flight awareness



- Operationally the change has been tremendous, improving utility, efficiency, average workload, comfort, potential safety, etc.
 - Navigation / position awareness
 - Higher component reliability
 - High-performance autopilots
 - Electronic flight bags / tablets
 - Access to information pre and in-flight
 - System monitoring, failure detection


≻But...



- >...Becoming and remaining proficient & vigilant is as, if not more, challenging than ever before
 - Typically, greater than 500 hours and \$30,000 required to become experienced instrument pilot
 - Required knowledge and skills have increased, not decreased
 - System and mode complexity has increased
 - Variations between aircraft, software loads
 - Pilot expected to detect, troubleshoot & backstop wider range of non-normals
 - Average workload is much lower, but peaks remain high, if not higher

NASA


...Realized safety has not significantly changed



http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/Pages/2012%20Aviation%20Accidents%20Summary.aspx

Top Accident Categories





• Significant improvement in accident rate by mitigating basic human errors and newer, more reliable systems

Are Autonomous Systems a Light on the Horizon?







Definitely, but We Should Be Realistic



- Costs are plummeting (sensor, computers, data algorithms)
- > But:
 - Rate of progress more modest that typically reported...



2003, Honda offers active Lane keeping assist system






Definitely, but We Should Be Realistic



- Costs are plummeting (sensors, computers, data, connectivity)
- > But:
 - Rate of progress more modest that typically reported...
 - Performance in complex, novel situations likely to remain brittle
 - Less capable but more reliable systems may have better return on investment
 - It's the corner cases that drive skills, training, monitoring, and costs not the nominal
 - Regulators need statistically significant operational histories before approving critical reliance on new technologies & operations without reversion to proven
 - One revolution at a time

Function Allocation, Humans and Automation



Areas of Knowledge and Operation...



Knowledge areas:

- Federal Aviation Regulations
- Accident reporting, NTSB
- Radio, communication procedures
- Meteorology, weather product and NOTAM collection, dissemination, and use
- Recognition of critical weather situations
- Safe and efficient operation of aircraft, including collision and wake avoidance
- Visual charts, procedures, pilotage, nav.
- Air navigation under IMC
- Air traffic control procedures
- Aircraft loading, weight and balance, performance effects
- Principles of aerodynamics, powerplants, and systems
- Human and aeromedical factor
- Aeronautical decision making and judgment
- Crew resource management

Operational areas

Preflight

- Cross-country flight planning
- Preflight inspection
- Aircraft Loading
- Passenger safety, instruction. loading
- Engine start
- Taxiing

In-flight

- Airport Operations (surface, air)
- Takeoff, landing, go-arounds
- Ground reference, performance maneuvers
- Slow flight, maneuvering, stalls
- Navigation & flight by reference to instruments
- Instrument procedures
- Emergency operations
- High altitude operations

Post-flight...

Pathway to Simplified Vehicle Operations (SVO)



- Transition from expert pilots -> trained operators -> users
 - Key steps:
 - 1. Demanding flight-critical, but **deterministic tasks** transitioned from human to **ultra-reliable automation**
 - Simplified flight control and loss-of-control prevention, navigation, propulsion & systems management, communication
 - Must avoid Air France 447-like breakdowns
 - Initially use non-deterministic autonomy as non-critical decision aids and in contingency/emergency situations
 - Flight and contingency planning & monitoring, decision support
 - Independent monitoring, and possible action, for imminent threats
 & self-preservation (e.g. pilot impairment, unstable approach)
 - As trust develops, transition tasks and responsibilities from human to autonomy
 - Operator training, licensing must evolve with technology, but full credit lags behind

Flight Control Example, SVO



- ➤ Motivation: "Stick to surface" manual control is significant component of flight training & loss of control greatest cause of fatalities
- ➤ Contributors: Coupling, unattended operation, trim, envelope limits/non-nonlinearities, complex dynamics

> Challenges:

- Simplify control without depriving pilot of essential authority & awareness
- Graceful degradation
- Regulation of airplane & pilot
- Cost

Potential approaches

- "Pilotless" autonomy: safety-critical control and decision making moved to vehicle
- full-time autopilot: human authority over flight parameters, flight tasks
- fly-by-wire: authority over real-time maneuvering, but not control surfaces

Example Simplified Control



Simplified control evaluation with non-pilots ~2001





- ➤ Numerous flights by non-pilots demonstrated ease of use potential—ILS approaches flown to decision altitude on 1st flight
- Envelope protection provided care-free handling at edges of envelope
- Trained pilots almost universally complained about "car-like" stick response

3 Epochs of Simplified Vehicle Operation (SVO)



SVO-1 (2016 – 2026): Key deterministic tasks relegated to automation

- Technology mitigates pilot as single-point of failure
- Immediately impacts thin-haul commuter mission and small aircraft markets
- Expect only incremental airworthiness certification accommodation, but lays foundation for future
- Current FAA training required (e.g. ab initio-to IFR in minimum of 70 hours)
- New pilots capable of comfortable, confident, near-all weather ops.

SVO-2 (2021 – 2036): SPC, Simplified Pilot Certificate


- Simplified training & licensing based on research and operational experience from SVO-1
- New flight system, interfaces, and operation standards that allow updates to training and operational regulations in Part 61, 91, and 135 taking full advantage of technology
- Goal ab initio to near-all weather pilot in <40 hours (similar to driver training)

> SVO-3 (2031 - 2051): Autonomous operations

 Autonomy is responsible for real-time safety of flight; user involvement is optional and at the discretion of the automation

Simplified Vehicle Operation (SVO) Roadmap





Next Steps, NASA



- ➤ Build community of interest and broad base of support
 - Participation of public, industry, academia and the FAA essential to technology strategy, execution, commercialization
 - Oshkosh forums
 - FAA-NASA Workshop this Fall
- Connectivity and partnerships with other NASA, DoD, DOT/FAA investments, programs
- >Coordinate technology roadmap development
 - Preliminary roadmap report out to NASA Aero, early 2016

Questions





Backup Material



Performance: How Safe is Safe Enough?

Small, commuter airline record highlights that even current small aircraft can conduct scheduled operations with safety higher than cars






- Note, equivalent safety per mile may not be societally sufficient if new mode is used to travel many more miles
 - Annual or life-time risk given typical exposure might be more appropriate
 - E.g 12.5K miles/per year by car for 80 years = 1,000,000 miles and a 0.63% lifetime risk of fatality

Technologies Critical to SVO-1 and 2



- Underlying safety-critical technologies enabling SVO 1 &
 2 are resilient automation, not non-deterministic
 machine intelligence
 - Human retains overall responsibility for safety of flight, but is **totally relived** from many low-level tasks and responsibilities that 1) increase training, 2) often bite (e.g. stall awareness)
 - Integrate existing, near-existing technologies to create deterministic automation as reliable as structure
 - Machine intelligence introduced, but not for safety-critical tasks; gain experience before critical reliance
 - Possibility of support from off-board personal, for example
 - Pre-flight, loading
 - Dispatcher-like support

Top Ten GA Accident Causes



- Significant improvement in accident rate by addressing basic errors
- Automotive-level safety achievable by improving relatively deterministic functions
- Age of current fleet contributes to component failure rate

Technologies Critical to SVO-1 and 2, cont.



- Sub-component failures, rare-normals must not require novel piloting skills, for example
 - Engine-out
 - Ice encounter
 - Loss of GPS
- Automation capable of emergency landing if pilot incapacitated
 - Digital (and/or physical) parachute
 - Much less demanding than full-mission automation due to special handling by other elements of the system (e.g. traffic cleared away) and relaxed cert requirements due to rarity of use (back-up to a rare event, not primary capability)
- Dissimilar strengths and limitations of human and automation increase joint system safety and performance while reducing costs and certification risk

SVO-3 Technologies



- > Final convergence of UAS and manned aviation
 - Passenger carrying UAS
- > Requires fundamental breakthroughs in machine intelligence
 - Time horizon uncertain
 - Current reliability of autonomous aircraft maybe 99.9% (in benign weather), but carrying humans as cargo requires 99.9999% or better
 - Full autonomy is estimated to be > 3-4 orders of magnitude more challenging than required for SVO-1 or 2
 - Incremental introduction still needed validate safe operation in real-world, novel situations
 - UAS experience will useful, but sUAS likely to take advantage of options not appropriate for manned aircraft and larger UAS likely to rely on remote pilots
- > SVO-3 leverages SVO 1, 2 and of course, advance autonomous vehicle research
 - Ideally, common-core across vehicle classes, applications